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Psychology. Psychollngulstlcs and Cognitive Science:
Is There 8 Place for linguistics?
Bruce L. Derwing
Dept. of Linguistics, University of Alberta
1. Introduction

In a paper now nearly a decade old (DelWing 1979), I oullined some of the early history 01
modern psyChology and linguistics. In brief, the origins of experimental psychology are generally
traced back to the tast hall of the nineteenth cenlury , and particularly to the work of Wilhelm
Wundt , whose deep interest in language is widely documented . At that lime the field of linguistics
did not yet exist as such, but there was a co·existent discipline called 'philology' that also
concerned itself with language phenomena . Although some of the major German figures in these
two lields apparently knew and to some extent even interacted with one another, there was lillie in
the way 01 overlap in the kind 01 work that they actually did. Specifically, while the PsyChologists
were concerned ''to trace the mental processes that precede, accompany and lollow utterances"
(in the words of one of Wundt's commentators IBlumenthaI1970:6]), the philologists were mainly
preoccupied with the much narrower, complementary lasks of studying genetic relationships
among languages and in clarifying the ways in which language forms changed through time.
The emergence of linguistics as an identifiable academic discipline was more-or-Iess
concurrent with the rise to dominance of the strict behaviorist tradition in psyChology, that
anomalous era when psychologists generally lost interest in the psyche. There is far more than
mere coincidence involved here. For to the extent that psychologists lost interest in internal
cognitive processes generally at Ihis time, they also lost concern for the speCial case of language
processes . By default, Iherefore, the investigaUon of language phenomena fell for a time almost
completely into Ihe hands of the linguists, who naturally carried along with them some of the
fundamental ideas they had received as part of their earlier philological heritage. The most
pernicious of these old ideas, in my view, was the notion that languages were analogous to Uliving
organisms" (ct. Bierwisch 1971 :13 and Robins 1969:181), and the corollary that words and other
language forms were ''things or natural objects with an existence of their own" (attacked in
Jespersen 1924:17) . Since these early days, in fact, linguistic theorists have largely persisted in
Ihe railied view of language as a kind of 'natural' object, analogous to a stone or organism, that has
an inherent organization or 'structure' that can be discovered and even 'explained' without
reference to those human beings who produce the lorms in the first place.
Eventually, 01 course , the limits of behaviorism became evident , psychologists renewed their
interest in the human mind, and it became respectable once again for them to be interested in
such questions as how language forms are learned, stored, retrieved and, in general, used. In
fact, i1 became much more than respectable, as a numer of influenlial figures (just like Wundt two
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generations before) came to the opinion thai human language was likely to provide one of the

best windows (if not the very best) on the human mind in general. As luck would have it, however.
because 01 the long period of benign neglect of language throughout the behaviorist era , the
psychology 0: the day had virtually nothing 10 say about the subject. (In lact, Boring's famous
history of the field [1950], does nol even mention the term "language' in its index!) Psychologists
were thus forced to turn to linguistics as virtually the sole repository of what knowledge of
language there was at that time, and when the term psycholinguislics was first coined in the
1950's, it was quite naturally anticipated that linguists would playa major, if not cenlral, role in the

development of the emerging new science thai this term was intended to denote, viz" "1he
science of encoding and decoding processes in individual

communicators~

(cf , Koch 1963:248,

citing Osgood)_
Moreover, on first inspection, the new cognitive psychologists very much liked what they saw,
which was a developing model of generative grammar that seemed to possess the appropriate
'dynamic' quality needed for the characterization 01 speech production and comprehension. As
shown in DerNing (1979) , however (see especially the 'cake grammar' oullined in n. 3, p,133),
generative grammars are, just as they have always been, models of static language 'products.' not
models of language processes or 'recipes' for assembling those products (cl. Chomsky 1965 and
elsewhere , who has repeatedly and vehemently denied the legitimacy of any such procedural
interpretations for grammars).
Thus in time the truth came out . linguists (still philologists at heart) were interested in
modeling 'languages' (or 'knowledge of languages', under some accounts), not at aU in modeling
the psychological acHvities of speakers or hearers, and the 'dynamic' characteristics of the
linguistic models that had once seemed so appealing for psychological purposes were exposed
as nothing more than a notational sham.1 By this date, in fact, the disillusionment of
psychologists with the formal linguistic approach seems to have become quite severe, in that
linguistic models of grammar have been widely judged to be psychologically unrealistic (cf. Carroll

1986:58 ).2
The task 01 describing and modeling actual language production and comprehension thus , by
default, lelliargely into the hands of psychologists and AI scientists, with results in the past

lef. the parallel swing in the view of the linguistic philosopher, J.J. Katz, who held in the mid sixties that 'every
aspect of the mentalistic theory [01 generative grammar] involves psychological reality' (1964:133), but by the mid
eighties had backed off to a fully Platonist view of grammars as 'theories of abstract objects' (1984:21) and of
linguistics 'as different from the psychotoay of language as number theory is from the psycholoay of mathematical
reasoning' (p_27)_
2while a small number of diehams and apologists still remain (e.g., Berwick & Weinberg 1983) who still hope to
salvage the old 'derivational theory of COOlplexity' theOIY by one means or another, the broad consensus today, among
linguists and psychologists alike, seems to be thaI that theory is as dead as a doornail, and along with it the feasibility
of the Idea that ~nerative grammars, as traditionally cooceived, have any likely role to play in psycholinguistic
modeling.
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decade or so of such dramatic proportions as to place linguistic research In an almost ludicrous
position, by comparison. Thus, for example, while generative grammarians preoccupy
themselves with such questions as whether or not certain pronouns and noun phrases can in
principle refer 10 the same person (such as the emphasized words in such marginally grammatical
sentences as Near!lML M saw a snake and To

mm, I spoke in IlmJ's office) and to concoct

various purely structural hypotheses to account for their own judgments (such issues, in fact , fonn
the empirical and methodological underpinnings of one of the more popular recent developments
within generative syntax, known as GB theory [d. Chomsky 19811), cognitive scientists have
meanwhile moved on to the experimental exploration of what specific semantic, morphological,
syntactic, discourse and pragmatic factors determine what the precise antecedent of a pronoun
actually is in a given on-line language use situation, which is, of course, the psycholinguistic
question of interest (see Smyth 1986 for a detailed overview and discussion , as well as some 01
the relevant experiments).
In short, linguistics, as it is normally practiced toelay, is lacing a crisis of relevance. As time
goes on, fewer and fewer psychologists look to linguists for ideas and evidence bearing on the
psycholinguistlc task (much less for guidance), and more and more look to their own resources
and models , which they can readily understand, Interpret and test. The essence of the crisis,
therefore , is not simply that psychologists are beginning to ask whether linguistic models are
relevant to their work (I.e., language processing in all of its forms, such as word recognition or
lexical access, sentence production, discourse comprehension, etc.), but that they have largely
finished with the asking and have deCided, for the most part, that the answer is in the negative .
They may still make use of a few fundamental ideas that were originally developed in linguistiCS
(such as constituent structure, the morpheme and the phoneme) , but they generally find current
theorizing to be largely incomprehensible, both in content and motivation. As a result, as Cutter
has noted, 'psychological research in the service of linguistics [has] almost disappeared'
(1986 :162); thus, if there are any new Ideas coming out of the field that might prove useful to the
larger psycholinguistic enterprise (as I have argued below), it is the linguists themselves who are
going to have to make this evident .
Alternatively, linguists may go on as before, blindly talking of the supposed 'explanatory
adequacy' of their ideas, but if they end up as the only ones who accept, believe or even
understand what It Is they they are doing, it will be they who are the losers . There is nothing to be
gained by beating around the bush: the hard fact is that psychologists can get along perfectly well
without linguisticS; at worst, they may reinvent the wheel (albeit in a more useful form) and plod
along somewhat longer than necessary with a less than optimum cross -linguistic perspective .
But, lor them, such a step will not be fatal, as the psycholinguistic enterprise is not in doubt:

speakers do produce utterances and hearers do comprehend them, and attempts to model such
real processes are on solid ground (as the current explosive growth of programs in 'cognitive
science'indicates) . On the other hand, linguistics cannot get along without psychology, not, thaI
is, if it wishes 10 continue to bask in the kind of 'cognitive limelight' that it has long since become
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acruslomed to . The pay-oil lor finguislics. it there is to be one at all, is to be found in the
contribution it makes to the cognitive or psycholinguistic enterprise. (What else, after all, are
linguistic theories good for?) In the dreary non--psychological, go-it-alone scenario of so-called
'autonomous linguistics: therefore, we can anticipate that the 'ield will surely shrivel back into an
isolated, narrow and purely taxonomic (I.e., arbitrary) enterprise that generates obfuscatory
descriplions of relatively obscure. dying languages, explores their (generally untestable)
historical origins. or otherwise occupies itsetf with esoterica thai are of lillie concern to anyone
else in the outside world.

2. On Making Linguistics Relevant
I, for one, however. remain convinced that linguistics (as the only discipline whose
practitioners are driven both by inclination and training to look hard al the details 01 human
languages) still has a great deal more to offer than that. but a malo' reconstruction job is now
required to demonstrate this, and, for reasons already discussed, the onus is now on us linguists
to make the case.
I therefore have two specific suggestions to offer at this juncture: (1) that linguists make some
effort to temper the current free -wheeling theorizing which now occurs in our field by constraints
that follow from experimental tests and (2) to demonstrate , once again by experiment, that
linguistic theory has some potentially useful raw material as grist for the psycholinguistic mill, and is
not just playing arbilrary 'games' with language forms. I will atte~t to illustrate each of these
possibilities here with examples setected from research recently conducted in

our own laboratory,

all of which ga ined impetus from developments in linguistic theories of morphology and
phonology .

2.1 PsychOlogical Constraints on LinguistiC Theories
One obvious way to improve the case that linguistic theory is relevant for psychology is by
demonstrating that linguistic theorizing is itself subject to psychological constraints . This is, in
fact, a minimum token of good faith that linguists are willing to participate in the psycholinguistic
enterprise, rather than lelling their specutations run rampant or even fly in the face of the best
evidence of psychological plausibility and accountability. Since linguistic theories invariably arise
initially out 01 aHempts to account systematically for regularities exhibited by language forms (Le. ,
the language product) , there is no guarantee , at the outset, that the systems ('grammars') so
devised will have any psychological content whatever, or even be readily interpretable in
psychological terms, as I have already indicated. Attempts can be made, however, to inject such
content and to develop such interpretations, and to test the resuning theories through
appropriately designed experiments (see Derwing 1979 and 1980 for an extended morphological
example , and the review by Jaeger & Van Valin 1982).
Since linguistic theorizing at base has so little in the way of essential psychological conten!,
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however, a perennIal problem is one of selection; that is, if nothing Is psychologically motivated or
directed at 1M outset. where does one start in the attempt to find areas of possible psychological
relevance? This is by no means a trivial question, since by all accounts (and especially, I dare say,
to the eyes 01 an outsider). the linguistic literature presents an almost bewildering array of detail
and formal descriptive machinery, enough to daunt even the most intrepid of curiosity-seekers.

Linguistic theory also appears to move at a staggering, even breathtaking, pace, such that just
about the time one has managed to pour through enough of the

deta~

to feel sJhe is getting a

handle on the situation, the ground rules or direction can suddenly change, leaving one to
ponder a theory that even linguists concede is no longer relevant or ln1eresting.

I can offer two guidelines on this score. First of all, given the relatively short half-lives that
novelties in linguistics do indeed seem to characteristically exhibit, these are probably best left
alone to stew in their own juices for awhile before the attempt is made to build any amitious
program of experimental psycho linguistic research around them.3 The fundamental ideas that
endure for many years. however, especially through some of the numerous paradigm shifts that
must make pure linguistics a particularly frustrating enterprise. are a different story altogether and
are probably some very good candidates for a closer look. My second consideration follows from
what Is undoubtedly the main motivation for experimental research in any discipline, namely, to
sort oul the wheat from the chaff_ Since practical considerations dictate that only a select number
of notions can be inspected with the requisite degree of care and perseverance, it follows that
attention should be directed first and foremost 10 lhose issues which lie closest to the heart of the
particular theories under examination, for If things are amiss at the core, the details scarcely matter
-

and by nipping misdirected theories in the bud, of course, a lot of unnecessary busy work can

thereby be saved by art.
For example, one of the oldest and most enduring of all the notions tram linguistics is the
concept of the morpheme . linguists may engage in apparently endless debate about the details
of exactly how words ought to be separated into their meaningful parts (not to mention about how
words themselves might best be defined or identified), or about how to represent or describe the
resulting pieces , or even about what to call these bits , but the basic idea 01 the morpheme as a
fundamental linguistic unit Simply refuses to go away . It makes good sense, therefore, lor the
experimental linguist to inquire whether or nol the morpheme is
everyday language learners and users -

a valid concept for ordinary,

and, it so, to try and find out where these ordinary

speakers draw their own lines_
Consequently. I spent more than

a decade, off and on, struggling with this issue, yielding the

battery 01 test questions that appears below. This par1icular question-set is taken Irom Smith &
Derwing (1987) , but its parts been used in various combinations in a number of studies to assess
a subject's ability (or willingness) to recognize a root morpheme (such as teach) as part of some
presumably derived word (such as teacher):

3See Van der Hulst and Smith (1982:2) for the briefest of epitaphs for a school of thouoht that dominated North

American phonoloOicaJ and morpholooical thinking for the better part of t\vo decades.
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01

Definilion of derived word. (Does the subject use the root? see
Berko 1958)

02 . Berko-type nonsense-word probe, (Is the root used? see also
Derwing & Baker 1979)

03. (CF-I) Does the derived word 'corne from' (CF) any other word?
(Is the root indicated? see Smith 198n
Q4. Does the subject know the root word? (confirmed by having
the subject define the word.)

05_ (CF-2) Do you think thaI the derived word 'comes from' the root
word? (asked if the root was not identified in 03) (Smith1987)4
Why do you think the derived word 'comes from' the word you
suggested? (asked if the root was identified in 03)

06. Did the subject ever think of this relationship before? (Derwing
1976)
This research has selVed to yield a good deal of interesting new data on the morpheme
recognition capabilities of linguistically untrained speakers, and especially on the role of the two
primary lactors of similarity in meaning and similarity in sound that bear on this issue. Various
auxiliary factors (such as orthography, construction type, affix productivity and the like) were also
identified which can influence subjects' judgments on Ihese tasks and which therefore need to
be controlled and independently assessed (see Derwing & Baker 1986) ,
Another fundamental and enduring idea from linguistics is the notion of rule , in our case a
phonological or morphological rule. In a language like English, of course, morphology is clearly
finile and, strictly speaking, rules are not necessary to describe the basic linguistic facts in this
domain , which could all be accounted for in principle by simply listing everything in the lexicon .
Moreover, even in a morphologically deprived language like English , it is well estabished that
some degree of morphological productivity exists, and that young English-speaking children are
prone to create 'new words' (like 'one-ty one' [meaning 'eleven,]) as the situation requires.5
This is powerful evidence that children can and do extract some kind of rules, or at least
engage in what has aptly been dubbed ' rule-govemed behavior.' But, assuming for the moment
that it is internalized rules of some kind that we are talking about here (I will later briefly discuss an

4McCawley (1986) has also employed avariant of this question, which elicited joooments on whether the root word
'was contained in' the derived word: and results are reported in Derwino and Nearey (1986) from a more direct
'word-cunino' experiment, as well.
5This need not imply, as in claSSical generative phonological accounts, thatlhe function of a rule is to simplify the
lexicon, or that aform listed in the lexicon could not also be derived by rule (see Derwing 1988b for some alternative
views that are consistent with current psycholinguistic evidence regarding the content and structure of the mental
lexicon)_

232

interesting alternative approach) , how lar does the child actually go? How general, in other words,
are the generalizations that the child latches on to? Linguists typically push generality to its very
limits , almost as an article of faith (this is the chief symptom 01 what I like to call 'the linguists'
disease,' which is to seek oul maximum regularity whether it is there to be found or not; see
especially Derwing 1973 and 1974), but what do ordinary speakers, once again, do? And which
particular rules, as postulated by linguists, might most profitably be examined from this
psychological point 01 view?
It was argued by Chomsky and Halle (1968) that a particular set of vowel alternations
constituted the 'central problem in the noncyclic phonology of English' (p _99) and that the key
rule involved (the so-called 'vowel shift' rule) was 'without doubt the pivotal process of modern
English phonology' (p. 187). There is litlle wonder, therefore, in the face of such strong claims,
that this rule (and its adjuncts) would capture the early aUention of those experimentalists who
were interested in assessing the psychological plausibility of classical generative phonology (GP)
and some 01 its laler successors (cf. Harre 1977 and Halle & Mohanan 1985). By this time,
therefore. a number of investigators, including two Alberta graduate students (A. Cena and H.S.
Wang), have subjected this rule and its variants to a quite extensive bit of psychological scrutiny,
using as many as four different experimental techniques : PRODUCTION TESTS (a la Berko 1958;
e.g., Ohala 1974; Steinberg & Krohn 1975), PREFERENCE or WELL-FORMEDNESS
JUDGMENT TESTS (e.g. , Myerson 1976, Armbruster 1978), RECALL TESTS (in which
nonsense word-pairs showing these and other, arbitrary alternations were taught to see which
pairs were remembered best -

and which ways the errors went when the pairs were mis-

remembered ; e.g., Myerson 1976, Cena 1976, 1978), and, finally , CONCEPT FORMATION
TESTS (in which some members of the supposed class were taught in order to see how well
subjects spontaneously generalized to the other supposed members; e.g ., Moskowitz 1973,
Jaeger 1980, Wang 1985). Data collected from all of these sources can now be seen 10 converge
on one clear and quite solid conclUSion, namely, that five of these ahernations operate together
as a (semi-) productive set , bul only five, and that these results fil none of the phonological
theories proposed. What the data do fit, however, is a theory that typical, literate English speakers
have pretty much all learned (or been taught) the familiar long vs. short spelling rule for the five
vowel letters of the alphabet (see Wang & Derwing 1986 for lull details).
So how can such developments be employed to enhance the psychological plausibility of
current linguistic theorizing? For an answer to this question, we cannot look to classical GP, as
that particular linguistic model has already died its own natural death (el . n. 3 above) . An approach
called lexical phonology (LP), however, is not only very prominent on the contemporary linguistic
scene, but is also the closest living descendant 01 the classical GP tradition and, of all its current
competitors , the model closest to it in spirit, as well (for example, it IXlsits very abstract underlying
forms, makes liberal use of extrinsic rule ordering, and still invokes the transformational cycle,
albeit in a somewhat more constrained form). lis main theoretical distinction, no doubt, is its
integration of morphological and phonological processes (with the consequent elimination of
boundary symbols) by means 01 an elaborate system of ordered strata/levels associated with the
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lexicon .
lP also incorporates one very i~ r1ant empirical advance, which ought not to be minimized.
Specifically , it explicitly specifies a level of representation ('lexical representation,' which is the
output of the lexical component and the input to a set of completely general 'post-lexical' rules) as
the menial representation or slore . This is also claimed to be the representation that serves as the

basis of native speaker same/different judgments, thai is associated with the assignment of
pauses , that is manipulated in secret code languages, and thai is even the level of representation

involved in speech errors (see, lor example, Mohanan 1982:78-94) . This is an important empirical
advance in two respects : first, it involves the explicit recognition of the essential relevance of
these lou r domains of data: thus any large-scale attempt to describe a language in this framework
will yield a large number of very specific representations that can in principle be subjected to
testing (see Campbell 1986, Hombert 1986 and Shattuck-Hufnagel 1986, wh ich nicely illustrate
some 01 the experimental possibilities) . It is also important to notice that in exposing itself to
potential fal sif ication in this way, LP makes a major gain in empirical content over dassical GP ,
which did not go out on such a limb as far as its own underlyino'lexica l representations were
concerned . (Fromkin thus makes some questionable assumptions in her analysis of speech error
data, concluding , among other things, that these data support the GP account that the English
velar nasal derives from an underlying /ng/ (1975: 511 ; however, now in LP, where underlying and
lexical representations are distinct and only the latter is taken as the level appropriate for speech
error manipulations, her results roost be explainable in terms of /rJ /, not the underlying or prelexical l ngl. Fortunately lor thelheory, Smith 1982 has already shOwn that the speech error data
can be accounted for at least as well under the I rJ l analysis as the Ing/ analysis. )
The unfortunate thing in all this is, however. that the true 'heart' of LP is not these lexical
representalions, which are the output of the lexical component, but rather the formal machinery
inside , together with the vast array of semi- or non-productive processes postulated as being
linked to morphological operations. Without gaining experimental access to these , therefore, any
model could claim empirical equivalence to LP by the mere positing 01 the same set of lexical
representations. It is in this area , therefore, that the procedures and findings discussed earlier in
this section can be employed to beneficial effect.
In LP, much as in its GP progenitor, morphological analyses and operations are predicated
upon what professional linguists lind intuitively satisfying or plausible (e.g., that such words as

fable and fabulous (a 'vowel shift' pair1 are morphologically related, and that some version of the
vowel-shill rule is a central part of the phonology at English (ef. Kiparsky 1982; Halle & Mohanan
1985]). There is no longer any good reason for linguists to base their theories on such an informal
body of evidence . Using the procedures outlined above lor morpheme recognition
(supplemented , perhaps, by other, more 'subliminal' approaches, as illustrated in Fowler, Napps &
Feldman 1985) , data can now be readily obtained for the empirical evaluat ion of any nurrber of
propo sed morphological relat ionships (see Oerwing 1976, lor example , for data on the specific

fable -fabulous pair) : by the same token, proposed phonologiCal or morphological rules can
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similarly be evaluated by means of the techniques outlined above that have successfully been
used for them (showing, as indicated, that vowel shift is not a viable phonological process at ali ,

but rather something quite different) .
II LP responds to this challenge of empirical accountability, its status as a plausible
psychological theory will correspondingly be greatly enhanced. On the other hand, if linguistic
theorists of this and other schools persist in their narrow-minded commitment to so-called 'internal'
(I.e ., familiar) evidence only (cf. Ohala 1987). they risk even further alienation from the very field
thai they most need to court. The relationship between theory and data is a reciprocal one: if
experimental evidence from real-lime language processing is irrelevant to linguistic theory, then
linguistic theory is, by the same account, irrelevant to real-time language processing. One cannot
have one's cake and eat it, too .

2.2 The Psychological Utility of Linguistic Concepts
Anolher way for linguistics to enhance its status in the eyes 01 psycholOgy is to show that at
leasl some of Ihe ideas that have emerged from purely linguislic research (that is, from the close
examination of so-called 'primary linguistic' data) have some potential utility for contemporary
language user models . One such model. called Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) (or, less
lormally, 'connectionist theory'), has recently generated a great deal of discussion and
enlhusiasm and has been specifically applied to the investigation of morphological issues (see
especially Rumelhart & McClelland 1986. which deals with the description and acquisilion of the
English past tense inllection) . In a recent review, in fact, Sampson sees in PDP not only an
empiricist model thai is likely to give Chomskian rationalism a good run lor its money, but even 'an
intellectual paradigm fully as revolutionary as the generative paradigm ever was' (1987:871). The
PDP analyses illustrated, however, are all cast in the framework of holistic segments (e.g., regular
allomorphs of the past tense inflection). without regard for their further analysis into bundles of
phonological features .6
There is good experimental evidence to indicate, however, that a feature analysis is required
(or some formal equivalenllo it) in order to account for the developmental sequences (or 'stages')
observed . This is particularly evidenl in the case of the regular English plural inflection. The
study involved was a cross-sectional one thaI used the Berko (1958) nonsense-word probe
technique as a test lor productive knowledge of the regular plural endings (Innes 1974).
Although an age-based analYSis did not yield any definitive developmental patterns, a new
analytic technique, called 'response coincidence analysis' yielded some quite remarkable results ,
which could only be seen once the subjects were pooled into homogeneous performance
groups (see Baker & Derwing 1982 and Woods , Fletcher & Hughes 1986, Chapter 14, tor
details) .

Ssome oflhe other problems with PDP-based linguistic accounts, such as those raised by Pinker & Prince in their
review (1988), are discussed in Derwlng 1988b.

235

The point of particular relevance to the issue at hand, however, is the fact that, at each stage
01 this developmental picture, performance on the nonsense

IV-stem was comparable with that

on the other sibilant-final Siems? What is remarkable about this, of course, is that there are no
plausible f1. l -stem plurals that might serve as the real-word analogs here, at least none that the
small children involved were likely to know.8 It looks very much, therefore, that the children
have learned 10 pluralize this type of nonsense stem not by analogy to other

111-stem words, but

rather by analogy to other (i.e ., non-I!!) sibilant stems. In other words , to accommodate such data
within a PDP account, it would seem that nodes for phonetic features would also have to be
appended, with vast further extensions to the connectionist networks involved.
Another place where linguistics might contribute to psychology is in the development 01
models of word recognition and/or lexical access. So far as I know, all such models have
heretofore assumed that lexical items were both represented and primarily accessed in terms of
their constituent phonemes, I.e ., individual segments (see, for example, Morton 1969, Forster
1976, Marsten -Wilson & Welsh 1978, Elman & McClelland 1984, etc.), though syllable strategies
might also be sometimes employed (Cutler et aI. , 1986). We have done a considerable amount of
work in our laboratory on the psychological status of the phoneme, as well as a number of other
phonological units that have proposed by linguists as potential 'building blocks' for the mental
lexicon.
The phoneme issue, in particular, has been explored here and elsewhere by means of quite a
number of different experimental techniques, including CONCEPT FORMATION (Jaeger 1980),
DISCRIMINATION TESTS (Derwing & Nearey 1981), STRING SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS (Vitz &
Winkler 1973; Derwing & Nearey 1986) and even simple SEGMENT COUNTS (e.g., Dow 1981 ;
Derwing, Nearey & Dow 1986). In general. the results of all of these studies tend to confirm a
Iraditionaltaxonomic phonemic analysis.
This supertically very neat picture is much complicated, however, by a rather large body of
literature which suggests that children and illiterates are not very good at counting or otherwise
manipulating individual segments or phonemes. (Some new data are reported in Dow 1987 and
Dow & Derwing 1987, in fact. indicating that English-speaking children are better even at
manipulating whole onsets than they are at manipulating any of their constituents parts.) Some
recent cross-linguistic work also suggests that educated adult speakers with non-alphabetic
orthographic traditions (such as Mandarin Chinese, as reported by Read, Zhang, Nie & Ding 1986)
can't manipulate segments very well, either. (To illustrate with an anecdote, one of our own
Chinese graduate students once confessed to me -

in pertect English - that before he had

7Except the Ill-stem , whose special status can be explained (see Derwing & Baker 1979:212).
Bunguists commonly use the word rou(J8S to illustrate this pattern in introductory courses, but this is a highly
marked plural of a mass noun - and even the root seems to be losing ground rapidly to blush these days. (There used
to be a word

fOIJ(Je,

I understand, to refer to a one-point conversion in Canadian football, but this usage has long

disappeared frOO1 the local scene in Edmonton.)
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slarlod 10 stUdy 'Western linguisticS: he had no idea that words like

can and not had anything at

all In common.) The potentiallheorelical implications of these preliminary findings are enormous,
for they suggest the strong possibility that. contrary to the long-standing tradition of western

linguistics. the segment (or phoneme) may not be the natural , universal unit of speech
segmentation, after all, and that the orthographic nanTIS of a given speech community may playa
large role in fixing the scope of the 'basic' phonological units thallhe members 01 such a
community actually perceive.
Finally, metrical phonology (MP) presents what is undoubtedly the most radically different of
the currently popular approaches to phonological theory. As is well known, it grew out of
consideration of certain suprasegmental phenomena (e.g., stress, and in autosegmental
phonology, tone) that could not be conveniently handled under the purely segmental approach
of SPE. The result has been the creation of a vast theoretical framework of new levels (tiers) and
units. As suggested by the preceding disclJssion, aU of this theoretical apparatus must be
empirically justified, if anything of psychological import is to be made of them.
To date, in fact , the results have been rather encouraging on this score . One important
feature of MP has been the re-emergence of the syllable as a viable structural unit ; moreover, no
longer is the syllable viewed as a mere sequence of phonemes (as in SPE and in Hooper 1972).
Formal (and presumably universal) procedures are proposed both for determining syllable
boundaries (ct . Selkirk's Maximal Onset Principle, 1982) and for analyzing the syllable into its
integral constituent parts, as in the typical right-branching structure for the English word blind,
according to which the syllable is first broken down into the onset /bl-I and the rhyme (or rime)

l-ayrdJ, then the latter into a nucleus (or peak) layl and a coda Indl. (Other theorists, such as
Iverson & Wheeler 1987, argue for a left-branching structure , at least for some languages, which
links the onset with the nucleus) .
The experimental investigation of these ideas was begun by Treiman in the early eighties

Ii
•

(Treiman 1982, 1984) and my student. Maureen Dow, continued the effort in her dissertation,
completed in 1987. We can now confirm , therefore , based on a variety of different experimental
techniques (unit counting , global sound Similarity judgments, and especially string manipulation
techniques of various kinds), that the integrity of onset and coda units has been established for
English , as well as the superiority at a right- over a left-branching model of the English syllable
(see Derwing, Dow & Nearey 1987 for a summary account) . On the other hand, more recent work
by Treiman & Danis (1988) indicates that , while English speakers are highly consistent in counting
the number of syllables in words , they are at the same time quite uncertain, under some
circumstances, about the location of the syllable boundary in VCV environments . This result
challenges not only the universal applicability of such influential prop:>sals as Selkirk's Maximal
Onset Principle (not to ment ion the associated notion of ambisyllabicity) , but the very idea of the
weU-definedness of the syllable in general. (Note that Cutler et al. 1986 also explain differences in
the speech perception strategies used by English and French speakers in terms of the relative
ease of establishing precise syllable boundaries in the two languages .) The results for MP in
general have thus been mixed so far; nonetheless, the results have been encouraging enough
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to persuade me that this is the most promising madellor the immediate future of phonological
investigation , which is precisely why my own experimental efforts have taken a sharp tum in its
direction.
At the very heart of MP, for example, is the venerable notion of the 'sonority hierarchy', i.e.,
that all segments have their natural place on a spec~ic sonority scale (with open or low vowels at
the high end and voiceless stop consonants at the other) ; this has served as the foundation
stone upon which syllable structures have been hypothesized in the first place . Recent
suggestions have also been made to the effect that there may be no sharp division between the
nucleus (sonority peak) and coda, but rather that segments are bound successively closer to the
vowel or syllable nucleus as a function of their place on the sonority scale. Such claims are also
specific enough to lend themselves to experimental test and we had some encouraging
preliminary results to report on this matter at the LSA in December (Derwing, Nearey & Dow 1987).
No single experiment is suff icient to conclusively resolve such issues, however. Since so many of
the experimental procedures we have been using are new and open to the challenge of validity,
we musllake pains to insure that our key findings can be replicated under varied experimental
conditions (cf . Derwing 1979). Perhaps an equally limiting aspect of our research effort to date is
its preoccupation with English; clearly, since universal claims are often involved, it is vital that
these experiments be extended to other languages (cl. Derwing 1988a) .

3. Prospectus and Conclusions
Either linguistics of the next century will forsake its autonomy and participate in the cognitive
enterprise as a full experimental partner or, if it persists in holding doggedly to its own set of
'purely linguistic' methods and mooels, it will likely wither back into its former role as a minor branch
of anthropology , roughly on a par with archeology , leaving to others the systematic exploration of
the unique 'window' that language provides inlo the human mind.
In sum, loday's linguist has come face to face with a question that I posed only in hypothetical
terms in Derwing (1973 :333) : cognitive science, with the study of language processing as its
heart , is alive and well and linguists are going to have to decide whether they want to participate in
its future development , or rather to continue to languish in their own little world of uninterpreted
models of language, where major decisions are made on the basis of 'thought experimentation'
and arbitrary principles of theory evaluation . I have no doubt which of these choices .linguists will
opt for in the long run, but in the short run they are letting others run far ahead with the ball. It
would be a shame if the first speaker-hearer models were built with scarcely a linguist on hand to
celebrate the event.
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